The upcoming US-India talks have allowed us to take a peek into the great power game unfolding in the Indo-Pacific. As the incumbent superpower seeks to formalise its alliance with an emerging power, China, the superpower-in-waiting, is engaging in a little gamesmanship. Beijing’s increasingly conciliatory tone towards India is aimed at escalating New Delhi’s diplomatic dilemma. The dialogue has become an inadvertent focal point.
This might seem a little surprising because in itself, the dialogue process between India and the US isn’t path-breaking. It is a continuation of the annual ‘Strategic Dialogue’ between the two sides since 2010 that has now been cast into a new ‘two-plus-two’ format involving foreign and defence chiefs from both sides. Still, the restructuring of high-level ministerial interaction into an annual discourse (with plans for its augmentation at lower levels of bureaucracy) provides continuity, a platform and an opportunity to engage in diplomatic debates, thrash out thorny issues, take stock of progress and plan ahead for the future.
In that respect, the talks fill a gap in progressively warmer bilateral ties. As Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow Alyssa Ayres points out in her blog, “The most important contribution (of Thursday’s 2+2 dialogue) lies in keeping a regular cabinet-level meeting on the diplomatic calendar. The intensified US-India relationship does not have the extensive diplomatic interactions that occur with longstanding US allies and partners, where gatherings have continued over decades to build a level of deep understanding.”
In as much as it symbolises the expanse, depth and scope of the bilateral embrace, the dialogue reflects, writes National University of Singapore director C Raja Mohan in The Indian Express, “the growing convergence of perspectives on regional and international affairs.” China is treating this convergence as a threat and the 2+2 dialogue as a ‘marker’ of that threat. It reads correctly that the US is betting on India’s emergence as the net security provider in Indo-Pacific to protect its domination and ensure the stability of a rules-based order.
As CFR senior and Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs Ashley Tellis writes on US objective in Asia, “The goal of preserving American primacy (against rising competitors such as China) … necessitates the pursuit of new approaches — primarily balancing — that rely in part on strengthening the capabilities of various Asian powers, such as India, because they happen to be China’s natural rivals.”
Driven by this strategic calculus, the US has sought to progressively tighten the partnership across a broad front — ranging from making India the focal point of its National Security and National Defence Strategy, working as an enabler for India’s regional leadership role, pursuing a “robust strategic and military engagement with India”, heeding its concerns on terrorism, taking a hard line towards Pakistan’s use of terror, relaxing export control norms, encouraging India to sign foundational agreements to boost transfer and interoperability of sensitive communication equipment, etc.
In pursue of this policy, the US objectives have sometimes clashed with India’s needs, compulsions and prerogatives. India’s $6 billion deal with Russia to buy five S-400 surface-to-air missile systems or its unwillingness to let go of the energy relationship with Iran present recent examples.
In most cases, it is the US that has taken an openly conciliatory posture, unlike India. To treat US posture as honest altruism, however, is to miss the underlying strategic calculation.
Therefore, we find US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reiterating India’s status as “a true strategic partner”, “only major defense partner… the only designated major defense partner, with whom we have a great relationship and who is very important to our success in our Indo-Pacific strategy” during an interaction on Tuesday with journalists.
Pompeo, who stopped over in Islamabad for a few hours to meet Pakistan’s newly elected prime minister Imran Khan before flying to India for the 2+2 dialogue, was quick to stress that the US shall try to “find opportunities to continue to expand the relationship not only diplomatic and military-to-military but a good set of business relationships as well.” He refused to attach much importance to the differences with India over S-400 and Iran, clarifying that it won’t be the “primary focus of talks”. Instead, the focus will be on “things that are big and strategic and will go on for 20, 40, 50 years”, according to a US Department of State readout.
Notably, ‘security’ is the focal point of US engagement, and its effort is concentrated on facilitating India’s power projection into the Indo-Pacific. It is attempting to draw India into a security architecture where New Delhi may have to make a military commitment in the future. This could be a sticking point in partnership because India is unwilling to be drawn into the game just yet. Its calibration over ‘Quad’ — exemplified by its rejection of the military component or Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s speech at the Shangri La dialogue — provides evidence of divergence in objectives.
Even as officials from both sides are poring over the draft of Indo-Pacific policy during 2+2 talks, The Times of India has reported on Tuesday that “for the present, India looks at the Indo-Pacific in economic and political terms, with a security aspect to be added later in the game.”
China has seen here an opening, and is wasting no time in exploiting it. It wouldn’t have escaped Chinese attention that India’s rejection of Australia’s request to join the Malabar Exercises coincided with the Wuhan Summit.
Last week, even as India and the US were gearing up for the 2+2 dialogue, China called India a “natural partner” in the Belt and Road Initiative and stressed that “CPEC does not jeopardise China’s position on Kashmir.” Speaking to the media in Beijing, Zhang Jun, China’s assistant minister of foreign affairs, said Modi and Xi Jinping’s meetings in Wuhan, Qingdao and Johannesburg have “added fresh and strong impetus to our bilateral ties.” He left no space for ambiguity that it is aimed at the US in declaring that “We are neighbours, we are partners…historically we were together and in future I never believe that anybody can separate India and China,” as reported in The Hindu.
It is a quantum leap from launching a full-blown psy-op war against India during the border standoff at Doka La to homilies on “inseparability” of “natural allies” — all within the space of a year. In a repeat of the playbook that we saw during Doka La, China is not averse to using its state-controlled media in controlling various aspects of its psy-war game. If the minister indulged in homilies, the media came out with a tougher response in a ‘good cop, bad cop’ routine.
Global Times warned on Tuesday that “US, India not on same page despite dialogue” in continuation of its strategy of discouraging closer ties between India and the US. Back in July, when the 2+2 talks were rescheduled due to Pompeo’s sudden dash to North Korea, the newspaper had cautioned India that getting drawn into US Indo-Pacific Strategy will cost India “development opportunity”.
“Any benefits from this strategy may be greatly outweighed by the costs to India," advised the newspaper, adding that “India needs to be aware that without paying heed to Indian concerns, the US' strategy is hampering, not aiding, India's domestic development. Rather than falling victim to the US' purpose of containing China's rise, it is better for India to look to China for ways of self-development. What India can learn from China is that its ability to stand on its own feet will determine its place in Asia and the world.”
Whether or not China’s gamble pays off will become clearer as we move along. India’s broad strategic concerns align with the US but until such time that it gets over its capacity constraints, India might find better logic in taking a cautiously conciliatory position against China.
To quote from Paul Staniland in War on the Rocks, “India’s rising GDP is not, at least yet, being turned into an equivalently improved balance of forces against China. If anything, the current risk is that the balance will shift against India as it struggles to adequately supply its forces with appropriate equipment. An India in military decline or stasis relative to China would certainly look to the United States for support, but would not be as useful to Washington as an India that can gain ground on its own.”
Viewed from this lens, China has a point and more than a fair opening. The US would do well to keep this equation in mind.
This might seem a little surprising because in itself, the dialogue process between India and the US isn’t path-breaking. It is a continuation of the annual ‘Strategic Dialogue’ between the two sides since 2010 that has now been cast into a new ‘two-plus-two’ format involving foreign and defence chiefs from both sides. Still, the restructuring of high-level ministerial interaction into an annual discourse (with plans for its augmentation at lower levels of bureaucracy) provides continuity, a platform and an opportunity to engage in diplomatic debates, thrash out thorny issues, take stock of progress and plan ahead for the future.
In that respect, the talks fill a gap in progressively warmer bilateral ties. As Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow Alyssa Ayres points out in her blog, “The most important contribution (of Thursday’s 2+2 dialogue) lies in keeping a regular cabinet-level meeting on the diplomatic calendar. The intensified US-India relationship does not have the extensive diplomatic interactions that occur with longstanding US allies and partners, where gatherings have continued over decades to build a level of deep understanding.”
In as much as it symbolises the expanse, depth and scope of the bilateral embrace, the dialogue reflects, writes National University of Singapore director C Raja Mohan in The Indian Express, “the growing convergence of perspectives on regional and international affairs.” China is treating this convergence as a threat and the 2+2 dialogue as a ‘marker’ of that threat. It reads correctly that the US is betting on India’s emergence as the net security provider in Indo-Pacific to protect its domination and ensure the stability of a rules-based order.
As CFR senior and Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs Ashley Tellis writes on US objective in Asia, “The goal of preserving American primacy (against rising competitors such as China) … necessitates the pursuit of new approaches — primarily balancing — that rely in part on strengthening the capabilities of various Asian powers, such as India, because they happen to be China’s natural rivals.”
Driven by this strategic calculus, the US has sought to progressively tighten the partnership across a broad front — ranging from making India the focal point of its National Security and National Defence Strategy, working as an enabler for India’s regional leadership role, pursuing a “robust strategic and military engagement with India”, heeding its concerns on terrorism, taking a hard line towards Pakistan’s use of terror, relaxing export control norms, encouraging India to sign foundational agreements to boost transfer and interoperability of sensitive communication equipment, etc.
In pursue of this policy, the US objectives have sometimes clashed with India’s needs, compulsions and prerogatives. India’s $6 billion deal with Russia to buy five S-400 surface-to-air missile systems or its unwillingness to let go of the energy relationship with Iran present recent examples.
In most cases, it is the US that has taken an openly conciliatory posture, unlike India. To treat US posture as honest altruism, however, is to miss the underlying strategic calculation.
Therefore, we find US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reiterating India’s status as “a true strategic partner”, “only major defense partner… the only designated major defense partner, with whom we have a great relationship and who is very important to our success in our Indo-Pacific strategy” during an interaction on Tuesday with journalists.
Pompeo, who stopped over in Islamabad for a few hours to meet Pakistan’s newly elected prime minister Imran Khan before flying to India for the 2+2 dialogue, was quick to stress that the US shall try to “find opportunities to continue to expand the relationship not only diplomatic and military-to-military but a good set of business relationships as well.” He refused to attach much importance to the differences with India over S-400 and Iran, clarifying that it won’t be the “primary focus of talks”. Instead, the focus will be on “things that are big and strategic and will go on for 20, 40, 50 years”, according to a US Department of State readout.
Notably, ‘security’ is the focal point of US engagement, and its effort is concentrated on facilitating India’s power projection into the Indo-Pacific. It is attempting to draw India into a security architecture where New Delhi may have to make a military commitment in the future. This could be a sticking point in partnership because India is unwilling to be drawn into the game just yet. Its calibration over ‘Quad’ — exemplified by its rejection of the military component or Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s speech at the Shangri La dialogue — provides evidence of divergence in objectives.
Even as officials from both sides are poring over the draft of Indo-Pacific policy during 2+2 talks, The Times of India has reported on Tuesday that “for the present, India looks at the Indo-Pacific in economic and political terms, with a security aspect to be added later in the game.”
China has seen here an opening, and is wasting no time in exploiting it. It wouldn’t have escaped Chinese attention that India’s rejection of Australia’s request to join the Malabar Exercises coincided with the Wuhan Summit.
Last week, even as India and the US were gearing up for the 2+2 dialogue, China called India a “natural partner” in the Belt and Road Initiative and stressed that “CPEC does not jeopardise China’s position on Kashmir.” Speaking to the media in Beijing, Zhang Jun, China’s assistant minister of foreign affairs, said Modi and Xi Jinping’s meetings in Wuhan, Qingdao and Johannesburg have “added fresh and strong impetus to our bilateral ties.” He left no space for ambiguity that it is aimed at the US in declaring that “We are neighbours, we are partners…historically we were together and in future I never believe that anybody can separate India and China,” as reported in The Hindu.
It is a quantum leap from launching a full-blown psy-op war against India during the border standoff at Doka La to homilies on “inseparability” of “natural allies” — all within the space of a year. In a repeat of the playbook that we saw during Doka La, China is not averse to using its state-controlled media in controlling various aspects of its psy-war game. If the minister indulged in homilies, the media came out with a tougher response in a ‘good cop, bad cop’ routine.
Global Times warned on Tuesday that “US, India not on same page despite dialogue” in continuation of its strategy of discouraging closer ties between India and the US. Back in July, when the 2+2 talks were rescheduled due to Pompeo’s sudden dash to North Korea, the newspaper had cautioned India that getting drawn into US Indo-Pacific Strategy will cost India “development opportunity”.
“Any benefits from this strategy may be greatly outweighed by the costs to India," advised the newspaper, adding that “India needs to be aware that without paying heed to Indian concerns, the US' strategy is hampering, not aiding, India's domestic development. Rather than falling victim to the US' purpose of containing China's rise, it is better for India to look to China for ways of self-development. What India can learn from China is that its ability to stand on its own feet will determine its place in Asia and the world.”
Whether or not China’s gamble pays off will become clearer as we move along. India’s broad strategic concerns align with the US but until such time that it gets over its capacity constraints, India might find better logic in taking a cautiously conciliatory position against China.
To quote from Paul Staniland in War on the Rocks, “India’s rising GDP is not, at least yet, being turned into an equivalently improved balance of forces against China. If anything, the current risk is that the balance will shift against India as it struggles to adequately supply its forces with appropriate equipment. An India in military decline or stasis relative to China would certainly look to the United States for support, but would not be as useful to Washington as an India that can gain ground on its own.”
Viewed from this lens, China has a point and more than a fair opening. The US would do well to keep this equation in mind.
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